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virtually unlimited extent, and have developed a more restricted rule than is
applied in basic tort law.46 Since the architect's negligence would lead to
property or personal harm, rather than intangible economic loss, it is quite
obvious that architects are not performing "Ultramarian" services, and hence
should be, like the contractors, subject to basic tort law. Of course, mere
proof that his plans were defective and that the building collapsed, will not make
the architect liable; it must also be shown that his plans were followed by the
builder.47 Similarly, the building contractor is justified in relying on plans and
specifications provided him if they are not so obviously defective that he
should be charged with notice of such a defect.48 The effect of this limitation
would be to make the architect solely liable to third parties where his plans
are latently defective.
CONCLUSION
New York has finally carried the MacPherson v. Buick doctrine to its
logical conclusion by removing the technical distinction between real and
personal property. By destroying completely the initially irrational exception
to tort law of non-liability for manufacturers, contractors, and architects,
based on privity, the court has established that the foreseeability of the injury
complained of should be the test and the classification of the object or tort-
feasor should have no bearing on the plaintiff's right to recover. It points up
the fact that the pendulum will soon swing to the point where courts will feel
no need to pay lip service to the MacPherson rule (thereby obviating the
apparent difficulty with respect to architects not dealing with a product), judg-
ing all tortfeasors on the same basis: where one undertakes to do a positive act,
one has the duty to do it in such a way as not to create a probable danger to
the person or property of those within the foreseeable scope of the risk.
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(b): ITS
APPLICATION UNDER ERIE R.R. v. TOMPKINS
Since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,' decided in 1938, federal courts in diversity
cases have been required to apply state substantive law. While the Erie Court
expressly relied upon statutory construction and constitutional grounds, 2 there
46. "If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect
a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle
doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences." Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
47. Bayne v. Everham, 197 Mich. 181, 163 N.W. 1002 (1917); Lake v. McElfatrlck,
139 N.Y. 349, 34 N.E. 922 (1893).
48. Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924).
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This case overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842),
the doctrine of which was that of supremacy of federal general law over the general law
of the states.
2. Id. at 72-73, 77-80.
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is little doubt that the more compelling reason for its decision was the Court's
belief that confusion and collusion were being served by having two courts in
a single state hand down conflicting decisions.
3
The Court indicated that federal substantive law was to be inapplicable in
diversity cases, stating that "except in matters governed by the Federal Con-
stitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the State. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power
to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state. ... And no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts." 4
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL RLULE 23 (b)
Rule 23(b) requires that a plaintiff in a derivative stockholder's action aver
that he ". . . was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which be
complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of
law. . . ."7 This "contemporaneous-ownership" provision can be traced to
Hawes v. Oakland, decided by the Supreme Court in 1881. The Hawes Court
suggested that rules were necessary to frustrate the collusive creation of
diversity jurisdiction.7 This reasoning gave rise to Equity Rule 94,8 a predeces-
sor of rule 23 (b).
Shortly after the adoption of Equity Rule 94, the Court, by way of dictum
in Dimpfell v. Ohio & Md. R.R., 9 called it a matter of substantive law. Almost
twenty-five years thereafter, but prior to the Erie case, Vcnner v. Great Northern
Ry.,10 rejected the argument that Equity Rule 94 had to be complied with to
give the court jurisdiction. The Court said, "neither the rule nor the decision
from which it was derived deals with the question of jurisdiction of the courts,
but only prescribes the manner in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised."'
Thus, ".. . if it appears that the plaintiff has not shown a case [within Equity
Rule 94] . . . the bill should be dismissed for want of equity and not for want
of jurisdiction."' 2 The Court did not clarify what was meant by this distinction
between "want of equity" and "want of jurisdiction."
3. Id. at 74-77. See Black & White Taxi Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U.S. 518,
532 (1928), where Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion, pointed out some of the undesir-
able consequences of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. See also Shulman, The Demise of Swift
v. Tyson, 47 Yale L.J. 1336, 1346-47 (1938); Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey and Day, Weary Erie,
34 Cornell L.Q. 494 (1949).
4. 304 U.S. at 78.
S. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). See, generally, 3 Moore, Federal Practice, '9 23.15, 23.18
(2d ed. 1948).
6. 104 U.S. 450 (1SS1).
7. Id. at 453. The court in this case did not have an issue before it enabling it to
promulgate the rule. The discussion by the court of collusion and of a rule to combat it
is necessarily only dictum.
8. 104 U.S. ix (1882). Equity Rule 94 thereafter was enacted as Equity Rule 27, the
predecessor of federal rule 23(b).
9. 110 U.S. 209, 210 (1884).
10. 209 U.S. 24 (1903).
11. Id. at 34.
12. Ibid.
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The post-Erie decisions, beginning with Summers v. Hearst,13 while reflecting
confusion as to this distinction, have consistently characterized rule 23(b) as
procedural.' 4 In the Summers case the court was faced with a conflict between
Equity Rule 27, the immediate predecessor of 23(b), and the case law of New
York' 5 which at that time had not yet adopted a state contemporaneous-owner-
ship statute. The court conceded that "the federal cases that discuss this section
of Rule 27 support the view that it states a principle of substantive law." 10
The distinction in the Venner case, then, was apparently considered to support
a substantive characterization of rule 23(b). The court, however, applied the
federal rule on the ground that it had been promulgated by the Supreme Court
as a rule of procedure. In the absence of such a promulgation the court said it
"might feel compelled," under Erie, to follow the New York law.17 When the
same question was presented a few years later in Piccard v. Sperry Corp.,'8 the
court, while granting that "... there appears to be some doubt as to the
applicability of the rule . . . ,",z relied largely upon the Summers case as
authority for applying it. Ironically, the Venner case, which the Summers court
impliedly viewed as indicative of the substantive nature of the rule, was cited
as further authority. This case, the court said, made it "evident" that the
Supreme Court considers the rule ". . . as being one personal to the plaintiff
with no question of jurisdiction involved."2 0
Thus the cases, both antedating and subsequent to the Erie case, are by no
means conclusive as to the nature of rule 23(b). The Supreme Court has said
that a failure to satisfy the rule will result in a dismissal for "want of equity."
If such a dismissal is res judicata as to the merits and the plaintiff has no
further recourse to the state courts, then rule 23(b) is substantive. If, on the
other hand, the rule is merely a procedural condition which must be met in
order to proceed in the federal courts, then the distinction between "want of
equity" and "want of jurisdiction" is of no practical effect. Thus, in Perratt
13. 23 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
14. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds,
326 U.S. 99 (1945) ; Benisch v. Cameron, 81 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ; Perrott v. United
States Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953 (D. Del. 1944); Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp.
1006 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 120 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1941); Lissauer v. Bertles, 37 F. Supp. 881
(S.D.N.Y. 1940). However, a strong post-Erie case for the proposition that rule 23(b) Is
substantive is Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1941), where the state law was
held applicable over rule 23(b). However, rule 23(b) was nevertheless applied on the
grounds that it was the proper thing to do where the state law (New Jersey) was not
clear upon the question. See also In re Western Tool & Mfg. Co., 142 F.2d 404, 408 (6th
Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 324 U.S. 100 (1945), where the court said, "it may be
that under the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . the provisions of the rule . . . must
yield to state law ... "
15. Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N.Y. 11, 94 N.E. 1088 (1911).
16. 23 F. Supp. at 992.
17. Ibid.
18. 36 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 120 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1941).
19. Id. at 1009.
20. Id. at 1010.
v. United States Banking Corp.,2 1 the court, in holding the rule procedural,
ignored the so-called distinction and said simply, "the action is to recover for a
wrong suffered by the corporation. Simply because a particular plaintiff cannot
qualify as a proper party to maintain such an action does not destroy. . the
cause of action."' At this juncture it seemed clear enough that prior courts
were not using the term "substantive" in the same sense that it was used in the
Erie case. Although no court had said so, all that a dismissal for "want of
equity" or a substantive characterization of the federal rule meant was that
while the court had jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship, the rule
imposed a limitation on the exercise of that jurisdiction.
T E CONFLICT BETwEEN RuLE 23 (b) AND NEw Yosa Lw
The Summers and Piccard decisions, decided when rule 23 (b) conflicted with
New York law,23 found no cause to ignore the rule in diversity actions. New
York thereafter conformed to the federal law by the adoption of a contempo-
raneous-ownership statute substantially the same as rule 23 (b).2 4 It seemed
then that the conflicts which rule 23 (b) theretofore created were now academic.
However, in 1944, New York enacted the first "security-for-expenses" stat-
ute,2 a law specifically designed to prevent "strike suits." A plaintiff in a
stockholder's derivative action, who is not the holder of either 5 per cent in
quantity of any class of stock outstanding or $50,000 in value of such stock of
the corporation, must, under this statute, post security for the reasonable
expenses which may be incurred by the corporation and other party defendants.
If the plaintiff can effect the joinder of parties holding a sufficient number of
shares to satisfy the 5 per cent or $50,000 requisites, the security requirement
will be vacated.2 6
In Noel Associates, Iw. v. Merrill27 the New York Supreme Court held the
security-for-expenses law to be substantive and independent of the contempo-
raneous-ownership law. Thus, a plaintiff who had joined shareholders who were
not contemporaneous owners within section 61 of the General Corporation Law,
was nevertheless held entitled to an order vacating the security requirement of
section 61-b.
Thereafter, in Cohen. v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,2 the constitution-
ality of a New Jersey security-for-expenses statute, basically the same as sec-
tion 61-b, was challenged and it was contended that, even if constitutional, the
statute was merely procedural and the plaintiff's right to maintain suit therefore
depended solely upon his satisfying rule 23(b). The United States Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Jackson, held the statute valid and called it a
21. 53 F. Supp. 953 (D. Del. 1944).
22. Id. at 956.
23. See p. 696 supra.
24. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61.
25. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61-b. Similar statutes have been adopted in other states.
NJ. Stat. Ann. § 14:3-15 (Supp. 1956); Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 12, § 1322 (1953).
26. Neuwirth v. Wyman, 119 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
27. 184 Misc. 646, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
28. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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matter of substantive law. Justice Douglas dissented in part, two other justices
concurring in his dissent, arguing that the New Jersey statute ". . . regulates
only the procedure for instituting a particular cause of action and hence need
not be applied in this diversity suit in the'federal court. Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure defines that procedure for the federal courts."12 0 Thus,
the three dissenters who considered the New Jersey statute procedural were of
the same opinion as to rule 23 (b).
Two years later, in Fuller v. American Mach. & Foundry Co.,80 a plaintiff in
a derivative stockholder's suit, having joined others whose holdings aggregated
$50,000, sought to have the order requiring the posting of security vacated.
The defendant objected that the intervening stockholders were not contempo-
raneous owners as required by rule 23 (b). The federal district court overruled
the objection and held that the law of New York, which under the Noel case
did not require contemporaneous ownership, was applicable. Previous deci-
sions,3 ' where rule 23(b) had been held procedural and enforced against all
stockholders including intervenors, were said not to compel a different conclusion
on the ground that they were decided before the Cohen and Noel cases and
before the enactment of the pertinent New York statutes. 82
In 1955, in Kaufman v. Wolfson"3 however, the same district court which
had decided the Fuller case came to a contrary conclusion. As in the Fuller
ruling, the plaintiff had sought to obviate the New York security requirement
by joining stockholders whose holdings aggregated $50,000. The court held
rule 23(b) applicable and required that all stockholders, including the Inter-
venors, qualify as contemporaneous owners. In support of its decision the court
argued that rule 23(b) had been consistently enforced previous to the Fuller
case, and the mere fact that New York had subsequently construed its statute
to permit the joinder of non-owners did not effect the federal rule. The court,
having properly disposed of one basis of the Fuller decision, proceeded to
reconcile its holding with the Cohen case. The court seized upon a dictum of
Justice Jackson to the effect that, the provisions of rule 23 (b) do not ". . . con-
flict with the statute in question [New Jersey security-for-expenses statute] and
all may be observed by a federal court, even if not applicable in state court."'8 4
The Kaufman court concluded that rule 23 (b) should be applied in the federal
court "even if not applicable in state court."
29. Id. at 557.
30. 95 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
31. See note 21 supra.
32. The result of the Fuller case could be accomplished consistently with the Cohen
dictum and with Piccard v. Sperry by permitting intervention for the limited purpose of
determining whether the state security-for-expenses statute is satisfied. This, however, would
lead to the awkward situation of having two types of plaintiffs--those who were such only
for reference to the state security-for-expenses statute and those who were such In the
proper sense, i.e., for pleading and arguing. The only virtue of such a classification would be
its novelty and, it is submitted, there would be only a surface reconciliation with Piccard
v. Sperry. When the court in the latter case spoke of intervenors it meant those who
intervened as plaintiffs for all purposes.
33. 136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
34. 337 U.S. at 556.
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CONCLUSION
The Fuller court, while recognizing rule 23(b) to be procedural, considered
it to be its duty under the Erie case to apply the state substantive law and to
ignore any federal law, even though procedural, which conflicted with it. The
Fuller decision would seem to be in error and properly disregarded in the
Kaufman case. The Supreme Court, after the Eric decision, had promulgated
rule 23 (b) as one of procedure. The Fuller court conceded this, but apparently
considered the Cohen case as indicative of a contrary intention. It would seem,
however, that the procedural classification of rule 23(b), upheld in the Kauf-
man case, is more in accord with the Cohen decision. While the characterization
of rule 23(b) was not in issue, the dictum of Justice Jack-on speaking for the
majority supports the procedural view. Moreover, all of the dissenters were of
a like opinion.
A second possible ground for the Fuller decision, namely, that federal pro-
cedural law in conflict with state substantive law will be disregarded and the
latter alone applied, is also inconsistent with the Cohen dictum. The plaintiff
in a diversity action is actually confronted by a double hurdle, being required
to satisfy both the state substantive law and the federal procedural law. Thus,
in the event that such laws are mutually inconsistent, as in the Fuller and
Kaufman cases, the plaintiff is relegated to the state courts for relief. Since
state courts have been the traditional and primary interpreters of state corpora-
tion laws, the Kaufman result has additional support from this very practical
aspect.
35. See p. 698 supra.
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